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The patent eligibility of stem cells–particularly those derived from human embryos–has
long been under debate in both the scientific and legal communities. On the basis of
moral grounds, the European Patent Office (EPO) has refrained from granting patents for
stem cells obtained through the destruction of human embryos. On the contrary, the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) has historically granted patents
regarding the isolation and use of human embryonic and other stem cells. To date,
these US patents remain valid despite an increasing onslaught of challenges in court.
However, recent precedents established in US courts significantly narrow the scope of
patent eligibility within biotechnology. This article compares the implications of recent
legal changes on stem cell patent eligibility between the EU and US.
Keywords: stem cell patent elibility, stem cell patent ethics, human embryo, stem cell commericalization, legal
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INTRODUCTION
Human stem cells have been a focus of research because of their ability to self-renew. Indeed, since
the discovery of stem cells over half a century ago, more than 5000 US clinical trials have utilized
stem cells (ClinicalTrials). Human stem cells fall into three primary categories: human embryonic
stem cells (hESCs), induced pluripotent stem cells (iPSCs), and human parthenogenetic stem cells
(hpSCs). hESCs are derived from human blastocysts. iPSCs do not rely on destruction of human
embryos and are instead generated directly from adult somatic cells (Takahashi and Yamanaka,
2006) by “reprogramming” them into a pluripotent state. hpSCs are relatively new and formed by
parthenogenesis (e.g., by chemically stimulating unfertilized oocytes), which also does not involve
destruction of human embryos. The oocytes are not fertilized and no viable embryo is created or
destroyed. Each of these types of stem cells has unique legal and ethical considerations regarding
patent eligibility. Further, the laws in the US and EU on patent eligibility of stem cells are not fully
settled and have significant differences. This paper will first summarize the recent changes in EU
and US biotechnology patent law, and subsequently compare the implications of the changes in
these jurisdictions.
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THE EU LAW ON PATENT ELIGIBILITY OF
STEM CELLS
Patent eligibility of human stem cells faces resistance in the EU
on morality grounds.
Directive 98/44/EC on the Legal Protection of
Biotechnological Inventions (the “Biotech Directive”) regulates
the legal protection of biotechnological inventions across the
EU. The Biotech Directive prohibits patenting uses of human
embryos for industrial or commercial purposes on a morality
ground (Directive 98/44/EC, Article 6(2)(c)). The EPO’s Enlarged
Board of Appeal (EBoA) applied the Biotech Directive and ruled
that claims directed to products which, at the filing date, could
be prepared exclusively by a method necessarily involving the
destruction of human embryos are not patent eligible, even if
the said method is not part of the claims [G2/2006 WARF, 2009
OJ EPO 306 (the “WARF decision”)]. The impact of the EBoA
decision thus depends on the definition of “human embryo”
under the Biotech Directive.
In Brüstle v. Greenpeace (Brüstle v. Greenpeace eV, 2012), the
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) interpreted the
term “human embryo.” The CJEU included into the scope of
“human embryo” not only fertilized human ovum, but also:
“. . . non-fertilised human ovum whose division and further
development had been stimulated by parthenogenesis. Although
those organisms have not, strictly speaking, been the object of
fertilisation, due to the effect of the technique used to obtain
them they are, as is apparent from the written observations
presented to the Court, capable of commencing the process
of development of a human being just as an embryo created by
fertilisation of an ovum can do so.”
(Emphasis added). As a result of this interpretation, the CJEU
held that a claim directed to “A cell culture comprising
primate embryonic stem cells” was patent ineligible under the
Biotech Directive. Directly following this decision, scientists
were anxious that funding for stem cell research and market
competitiveness for stem cell therapies would decrease in EU
(Abbott, 2011).
The CJEU apparently drew the line around “human embryo”
by the capability of “commencing the process of development
of a human being.” However, the capability is not fixed but
may change over time when new scientific discoveries make
tissues previously not capable of “commencing the process of
development of a human being” capable of doing so.
This changing scope of “human embryo” due to new
scientific development was recently manifested in a case
before the CJEU. International Stem Cell Corporation (ISCC)
applied in the UK for two patents relating to methods where
parthenogenesis is used to activate a human oocyte. Using
the Brüstle decision as a precursor, the UK Patent Office
concluded that because the parthenogenetically derived structure
(parthenote) was analogous to the blastocyst stage of normal
embryonic development, this fell within the definition of
“human embryo,” and was thus excluded from patentability. A
parthenote is an unfertilized egg chemically induced through
a process called parthenogenesis to begin developing as if
it had been fertilized, and behaves like an embryo in early
development.
ISCC appealed to the English High Court questioning the
clause—“capable of commencing the development of a human
being (International StemCell Corporation v. Comptroller General
of Patents, UK, 2013).” ISCC argued that a parthenogenetically
stimulated human oocyte was not capable of producing an
embryo due to its inherent biological limitations, explaining that
a parthenote contains only thematernal nuclear chromosome but
no paternal DNA and is known to not undergo full development
to give rise to an embryo.
It is clear from the CJEU’s analysis of the Brüstle case that
at the time, scientific knowledge stated that an unfertilized
human ovum whose division and further development had
been stimulated by parthenogenesis did have the capacity
to develop into a human being. However, current scientific
knowledge has established that mammalian parthenotes cannot
develop into viable human beings because they lack the
paternal DNA necessary for the development of extra-embryonic
tissue (Brevini et al., 2008). Human parthenotes have been
shown to develop only to the blastocyst stage over about
five days. Thus, on December 18, 2014, the CJEU concluded
“that unfertilized human ovum whose division and further
development had been stimulated by parthenogenesis does
not constitute a ‘human embryo”’ (International Stem Cell
Corporation v. Comptroller General of Patents, CJEU, 2014).
By narrowing the definition of “human embryo,” the CJEU
indirectly reduced the reach of the WARF decision of the EBoA
and the Brüstle decision and opened the door for patenting
hpSCs.
The ISCC decision differentiating a parthenote from an
embryo invites at least two questions. First, if a human parthenote
is not a potential human life but a human embryo is, what
exactly is the characteristic of life that is present in the
embryo formed from blastocyst during fertilization but not in
the parthenote-derived blastocyst from which stem cells are
harvested, disregarding paternal DNA contribution? Second,
what is the definition of “human”? Since genetically-engineered
humans cannot be patented either in the EU or in the US,
but genetically-manipulated animals (e.g., oncomouse) can be
patented in the US, what fundamentally is the difference between
an animal, such as a monkey, and a human being? This is not
just a rhetorical question, since a patent application for a part-
human part animal-chimera was filed to the USPTO in 1998
but rejected on the grounds of the 13th amendment of the US
Constitution prohibiting slavery and ownership of human beings
(Chakrabarty, 2003). Nevertheless, the pertinent question, both
moral and legal, is how many human characteristics, including
certain number of human genes, must be present in an animal
to give it the legal status of a human? The problem is more
acute in the EU where the ordre public and morality clause
prevent patenting of not only humans but also human cells or
organs.
In summary, though the ISCC decision allows patenting of
both iPSCs and parthenotes, (as these cells are incapable of
becoming human beings), the EU still remains strict on its policy
against patent protection of hESCs.
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THE US LAW ON PATENT ELIGIBILITY OF
STEM CELLS
In contrast to that of the EU, US law poses no morality-based
barrier to patenting human stem cells Public Law (1996). In the
US, patent eligible subject matter is “any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof.” 35 USC §101. Although the US
Supreme Court noted that “Congress plainly contemplated that
the patent laws would be given wide scope,” the Court has created
three exceptions to patent eligible subject matter: laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas (Diamond v. Diehr, 1981;
USPTO, 2014).
For a particular kind of human stem cell to be eligible for
patents, it must not fall under any of the three exceptions, the
most relevant of which is the natural phenomena exception.
In Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the US Supreme Court clarified
that merely being alive is not sufficient to exclude an invention
from patent eligible subject matter under §101 (Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 1980). Namely, merely being alive does not cast an
invention into the natural phenomena exception. Stem cells have
been patented in the US under this pretense for the past thirty
years.
On the other hand, with regards to the government
funding of human embryonic stem cell research, from 1996
to 2009, the Dickey-Wicker Amendment of 1996 prohibited
the use of government funds for any research that destroyed
and created human embryos (Zachariades, 2013). In 2009,
President Obama’s Executive Order allowed the funding of
research that employed embryos, if these embryos were
created during in vitro fertilization for reproductive purposes
but were no longer needed for such purposes (Zachariades,
2013).
The recently enacted Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA)
and influential Court decisions regarding BCRA1/2 and cell-
free fetal DNA may significantly limit, however, the scope
of biotechnology patent eligibility in the US. These dramatic
changes in the law may directly oppose the vision of Shinya
Yamanaka, a strong believer in the importance of stem cell
patenting to promote research, drug discovery, regenerative
medicine, and global access (Yamanaka, 2015).
AIA
The AIA, passed in September 2011, provides that “no patent
may issue on a claim directed to or encompassing a human
organism (Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), Pub. L.
112-29, sec. 33(a), 125 Stat. 284).” The AIA is the most
significant patent change in the US since 1952. The legislative
history of AIA clarifies that under this act, stem cells are
patent eligible but patent claims directed to or encompassing a
human organism, including human embryos are prohibited (157
Cong. Rec. E1177-04 Testimony of Representative Dave Weldon
previously presented in connection with the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. 108-199, ′634, 118 Stat. 3,
101, and later resubmitted with regard to the AIA; see 149
Cong. Rec. E2417-01). The AIA, however, does not define the
term “human organism.” In the future, if the US Supreme
Court interprets “human stem cells” as being a kind of
“human organism,” stem cells would be patent ineligible. After
this ruling, in late 2011, Geron–a biotechnology company
that develops and commercializes therapeutics for cancer by
inhibiting telomerase—announced an abandonment of hESC
research (Torrance, 2013).
Myriad
In Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.
(2013), hereafter referred to as theMyriad decision, the Supreme
Court ruled that cDNAs are patent eligible, but isolated DNAs
are not. The case revolved around two important societal
issues: breast cancer and gene patenting. In the mid-90s,
Myriad Genetics Inc. successfully sequenced and developed a
comprehensive diagnostic test for hereditary breast cancer based
on mutations in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes. Myriad’s US Pat.
No. 5,747,282 claimed, “An isolated DNA coding for a BRCA1
polypeptide, said polypeptide having the amino acid sequence set
forth in SEQ ID NO:2.”
As per the Myriad decision, DNA means genomic DNA that
has been “isolated” from the body, and “isolated” means merely
removed and separated “from the surrounding genetic material”;
cDNA means “synthetically created DNA... which contains the
same protein-coding information found in a segment of natural
DNA [exons] but omits portions within the DNA segment that
do not code for proteins [introns].” TheMyriad decision explains
“what is not implicated by this decision” and states, “We merely
hold that genes and the information they encode are not patent
eligible under §101 simply because they have been isolated
from the surrounding genetic material.” But notwithstanding the
disclaimer, the lower courts may apply the Myriad decision to
imply that if a stem cell is closer to being merely “isolated” from
the body, the stem cell is likely not patent eligible. Conversely,
if a stem cell is a synthetically created stem cell that contains
the same information found in a natural stem cell but omits
portions within the natural stem cell, e.g., portions that cannot
replicate, then the synthetically created stem cell is likely patent
eligible.
The Myriad decision appears to undermine the patent
eligibility of hESCs because isolated and purified hESCs are
essentially identical to hESCs in human blastocysts. Such a
contention resonates with many people who are either against
patenting any part of the human body or interfering in the natural
processes of human development.
In fact, Consumer Watchdog used AIA and Myriad as
the basis to challenge WARF and thus appeal to the courts
to repeal patents on isolated stem cells. However, in June
2014 the Federal Circuit Court said that it was required
that there be an “actual case or controversy”—because WARF
never sued Consumer Watch, the courts said the group did
not have standing to appeal (Sherkow and Scott, 2015). This
demonstrates that in the future, other patent petitioners on
behalf of public health (like in the Myriad decision) will
likely attempt to repeal patent protection of isolated stem
cells.
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It does not matter, for the purposes of defining something as
a product of nature, whether the product contains only one or
millions of nucleotides or amino acids. What matters is whether
the nucleotides or amino acids are in their natural form that exists
in the body, other than having been isolated from their natural
environment. If so, then these products are not patent eligible.
If, however, the products are not only isolated from their natural
environment, but also purified such that they are no longer in
their natural form (such as by removal of introns), then such
purified and isolated products are patent eligible.
Sequenom
Amore recent decision in June 2015 further supported this trend
of legal change with respect to patent eligible subject matter
in biotechnology. In Ariosa Diagnostics Inc. v. Sequenom Inc.
(2015) (hereafter referred to as the Sequenom case), the US Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit invalidated Sequenom Inc.’s
patents on methods of using cell-free fetal DNA (cffDNA)—a
naturally occurring extracellular fetal DNA that circulates in the
blood stream of an expecting mother–for the efficient detection
of fetal genetic defects. Although the court acknowledged
that the Sequenom claims represented an important scientific
breakthrough, the fact that cffDNA in the maternal blood is
a natural phenomenon is indisputable. Moreover, the Federal
Circuit concluded that the routine and well understood methods
of DNA detection were not sufficient to transform the claimed
subject matter into a patentable application. In the US, a method
claim is patentable if either the composition of matter in the
claims is patent eligible, novel, and non-obvious or the method
steps are novel and non-obvious. In Sequenom, the courts decided
that cffDNA (composition) was not patent eligible and that the
methods of detection were obvious.
These cases bring to question—what extent of man-made
alteration is necessary for a stem cell to not simply be considered
an isolated form? Myriad demonstrates that while cDNA is
patentable, isolated DNA is not; it is unclear how these cases will
affect the patentability of stem cells in US.
IMPLICATIONS
In the EU, it appears likely that the morality clauses excluding
the patent eligibility of hESCs will remain in effect. The EU’s
narrowed patentability for hESCs was thought to be a potential
obstacle to hESC commercialization in Europe in comparison to
the US (Porter et al., 2006).
In the US, however, the fate of hESC patents is tremendously
uncertain. As explained in the above sections, as the US
significantly narrows the scope of patent eligible subject matter
in biotechnology, stem cells face the risk of becoming classified
as patent ineligible subject matter. Despite the absence of a
morality clause, one could foresee the US hESC patent policies
approaching those of the EU.
Indeed, the dramatic change in the law in recent years may set
the stage for how future issues will be decided in the US. The next
center of debate may well be the patents regarding hESCs held by
WARF. WARF US Patent No. 7,029,913 relates to a replicating
in vitro cell culture of human embryonic stem cells. The WARF
patents have been challenged on grounds of patent eligibility by
Consumer Watchdog and the Public Patent Foundation. At the
core, the prosecutors categorize the hESC patents as naturally
occurring phenomenon. In this light, comparisons are made
between the original stem cells and naturally occurring DNA, and
the cultured stem cells and artificial cDNA. Thus far, the patents
have survived at the US Court of Appeals of the Federal Circuit,
which rather than ruling on the validity of the patents, ruled that
as a third party not directly harmed by the decision, Consumer
Watchdog did not have the legal standing, but this could change
(Consumer Watchdog v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation,
2014).
Looking ahead, the curtain is far from being closed. If the
right group with standing litigates and succeeds in spurring
a widespread social movement, it is unknown whether hESC
patents will survive in the US. Indeed, the convergence of
US and EU laws regarding stem cell patent eligibility may be
inevitable.
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